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Abstract 
 
This thesis employs Robert Putnam’s concept of foreign pressure (“suasive 
reverberation”) to analyze the battle in the US Congress over the 2015 Iran nuclear 
accords. Drawing on the public statements of key players, journalistic sources, and the 
congressional record, I contend that the most important factor in determining whether 
undecided lawmakers voted for or against the agreement was lobbying by other states. 
Specifically, the survival of the deal can be credited to appeals from France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom, as well as to a lesser degree from Russia and China. Working 
in close conjunction with the Obama Administration, representatives of these states 
successfully pressured wavering members of Congress to support the agreement. I also 
argue that, counter-intuitively, the government of Israel’s suasive reverberation in 
opposition to the Iran accords probably contributed to the deal’s survival. The methods 
and rhetoric used in Israel’s lobbying were perceived as partisan and sparked a 
backlash among Democratic members of Congress, leading them to close ranks and 
vote to approve the deal. Through examination of these divergent outcomes, this paper 
provides empirical support for the importance of suasive reverberation and sheds light 
on the conditions underlying its use, success, and failure.  
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Introduction 
 
In April 2016, President Obama made a high-profile trip to the United Kingdom. In 
addition to attending tea with the Queen, the President issued a very public plea for the 
UK to remain in the European Union, an issue to be decided in a referendum later that 
year.1 Reaction to Obama’s appeal was predictably mixed. Proponents of Brexit decried 
attempts at what they deemed ‘meddling’, while opponents cheered the President’s 
support and hoped that the popular American leader’s voice might help sway an 
undecided electorate. In the end, Britain voted narrowly, 51.9% to 48.1%, to leave the 
EU.2 The impact of the President’s message may never be known –  perhaps it slightly 
aided the Remain campaign, perhaps it backfired and helped the Brexit cause, or 
perhaps it was simply ignored. The two-month period between Obama’s visit and the 
date of the vote, while perhaps necessary for the President to avoid charges of 
interfering directly with the referendum, probably had the result of blunting the effect 
of Obama’s message, for better or worse.  
Regardless of its ultimate impact, Obama’s transatlantic overture illustrates a 
phenomenon that has largely escaped scholarly attention, as it falls squarely into the  
gap between the disciplines of international relations and political science. State leaders 
can and do cross national boundaries to appeal directly to foreign politicians, parties, 
and public opinion, and these appeals can and do have a significant impact on target 
states’ politics. By altering domestic equilibria, these appeals can fundamentally 
reshape international relations. This phenomenon, suasive reverberation, is the focus of 
this paper.   
Putnam (1988) was the first to formalize the concept of suasive reverberation, as 
part of his influential ‘two-level game’ model of interstate negotiations. In his model, 
executives (‘Chief of Governments’, or COGs) simultaneously conduct two interlocking 
sets of negotiations, one with their foreign counterpart(s) to formulate an international 
agreement, and one with their own domestic constituencies (e.g. publics, parliaments, 
and interest groups) to ratify and successfully implement the agreement.  
As a corollary, Putnam introduced the concept of ‘winsets’, defined as the range 
of all possible agreements a given player finds acceptable. He argued that the calculus 
of the two-level game lay in attempts to expand or contract winsets of players at both 
levels through threats, promises, side payments, and other devices. He gave one type of 
strategic technique the newly coined label “suasive reverberation” and defined it as 
                                                             
1 Obama gave a joint speech with Prime Minister Cameron, accessible at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/22/remarks-President-obama-and-prime-minister-
cameron-joint-press and also wrote an editorial for the Telegraph, accessible at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/21/as-your-friend-let-me-tell-you-that-the-eu-makes-britain-
even-gr/  
2 Erlanger 2016 
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“messages from abroad [that] can change minds, move the undecided, and hearten 
those in the domestic minority”.3 In sum, suasive reverberation represents attempts by 
foreign governments to influence the domestic politics of a negotiating counterpart by 
expanding (or contracting) the winsets of its key domestic players.  
Suasive reverberation has not received the attention it deserves in the scholarly 
literature. Short of invasions or sponsoring coups, it represents one of the most 
dramatic forms of foreign interference in the supposedly autonomous domestic politics 
of other states. Examples can be ripped from the headlines, like the Ukrainian foreign 
minister campaigning on the streets of Amsterdam for a ‘yes’ vote on a Ukraine-EU 
association agreement.4 Seminal instances can also be found throughout history, like 
Sadat’s 1977 speech to the Knesset,5 and Gorbachev’s 1989 visit to Beijing.6     
 Indeed, the very nature of some of the world’s most intractable political 
problems, along with the magnifying effect of advances in telecommunications and 
social media technology,7 suggest that the importance of suasive reverberation as a 
political tool will only increase in the future. For example, Shamir and Shikaki (2005) 
suggest that bold, self-binding suasive reverberation could be the only way to break the 
current impasse of the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The festering legacies of World War II 
that continue to strain relations between the Koreas, China, and Japan are likewise 
highly sensitive, for good or ill, to suasive reverberation. For example, a single ill-
considered remark from Japanese leaders triggers riots on the mainland, but that same 
intensity of feeling means that genuine attempts at public reconciliation might move 
mountains.8 And above all, the looming threat of global climate change as a 
quintessential collective action problem will also likely invite attempts by other states to 
interfere in the domestic politics of potential holdouts and free riders.9   
  
Design and Research Aims 
 
This study is not a comprehensive application of the two-level game model to the Iran 
nuclear negotiations. Instead, I will focus exclusively on the role suasive reverberation 
played in the domestic ratification process of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action) in the US Congress. Specifically, I will examine two opposing attempts at 
suasive reverberation targeted at Congress: one, from Israel, attempting to convince 
                                                             
3 Putnam 1988 455 
4 Tomkiw 2016 
5 Stein 1993 
6 Chung 2001 79-82 
7 See, for example, the US State Department’s “21st Century Statecraft” manifesto, accessible at                                                               
http://www.state.gov/statecraft/overview/index.htm 
8 He 2007 
9 See Newell 2006 27-28; Lisowki 2002; Kroll and Shogren 2008. 
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legislators to reject the JCPOA, and the other, from the nations of France, Germany, and 
the UK, and to a lesser degree Russia and China (the ‘P5 + 1’) to convince them to 
approve it. I will also retain the term winset from Putnam’s original article because it 
provides a useful frame of reference for conceptualizing how suasive reverberation 
operates within a domestic political environment.  
 The US debate over the JCPOA represents an ideal test case because it provides 
us with not one but two simultaneous and opposing attempts at suasive reverberation, 
each from highly contrasting sources. The result is something approximating an 
experimental design – two different attempts, targeted at the same domestic players – 
potentially yielding deeper insights as to why suasive reverberation succeeds or fails 
than a simpler monothematic case.   
 And that is the aim of this study: to shed light on a fundamental set of puzzles 
about how suasive reverberation operates. My analysis focuses particularly on how 
partisan politics and ideological affinities affect the reception of reverberation attempts. 
Additionally, I seek to explain how and why COGs sometimes collude and sometimes 
clash in the course of suasive reverberation, and how recent historical events might 
function as a lodestar for domestic players in interpreting foreign appeals. These areas 
of investigation culminate in my research question: Why did Israel’s attempts at suasive 
reverberation fail while the P5 + 1’s attempts succeeded?  
To answer this question, I will employ process tracing within the context of a 
case study, relying on press reports, the congressional record, and, most importantly, 
the public statements key legislators released when announcing their decisions on the 
JCPOA.10 The latter are invaluable primary documents offering a glimpse into how 
domestic players factored various attempts at suasive reverberation into their decision-
making processes. 
If my contentions about the importance of suasive reverberation are correct, we 
would expect to find implicit or explicit traces of suasive reverberation in these various 
sources. Targeted congresspeople might refer directly to speeches, writings, or meetings 
with foreign representatives, and would ideally stress such influences as key factors in 
their decision-making. Alternatively, we could find evidence for the impact of suasive 
reverberation if the talking points and rhetoric of foreigners’ suasive reverberation are 
imitated either loosely or verbatim in legislators’ justificatory statements, even if the 
foreign source is not explicitly credited. Another, more subtle method of demonstrating 
influence is to look closely at the timing of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decisions. If, for example, five 
Senators held a meeting with the Israeli ambassador and then the same five Senators 
announced their ‘no’ decision en masse the following day, this might be taken as 
(circumstantial) evidence of the effectiveness of the Israeli lobbying.   
                                                             
10 Specifically, this paper employs what Collier 2012 describes as the method of “descriptive inference” 
and Van Evera’s 1997 conception of case studies.  
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Conversely, if certain attempts at suasive reverberation were not effective, we 
might expect to find explicit rejections of these attempts, such as lambasting ‘foreign 
meddling’, questioning the motives of those nations performing the lobbying, and even 
engaging in personal attacks on the relevant foreign leaders themselves. Importantly, 
this negative reaction to suasive reverberation must come from the specific target 
group, and should not be conflated with negative reaction from other domestic players. 
That is, if Democratic Senators or Texas politicians are the intended target of the foreign 
lobbying, than umbrage from Republicans or from Iowans, while fascinating and 
worthy of study, is of little import to the specific argument at hand.   
 
Literature Review 
 
Three main areas of scholarly work are most relevant to a study of the suasive 
reverberation directed towards Congress vis-à-vis the Iran nuclear agreement. The first 
is the two-level game literature, which generated the term suasive reverberation and 
which contains the few examinations of suasive reverberation that have been carried 
out to date. The second is work drawn from the discipline of political science, focusing 
on the current domestic politics of foreign affairs in the United States. This is useful for 
establishing a sketch of the conditions under which suasive reverberation surrounding 
the Iran deal was received in Congress. Finally, a smaller subset of political science 
studies concern the US pro-Israel lobby. While this lobby consists of domestic persons, 
it obviously has an intimate connection with the state of Israel, and the foreign 
(especially Israeli) attempts at suasive reverberation surrounding the JCPOA cannot be 
understood in isolation from this significant force in Congressional foreign policy.      
 
Two-Level Game Literature 
 
Much of the two-level game literature (for example, Krauss 1993; Paarlberg 1997; Milner 
1993; Patterson 1997; Hosli 2000; Larsén 2007) concerns trade negotiations involving 
banks, industries, or union lobbies whose interests are purely economic and narrowly 
rational. Appeals from foreign governments are unlikely to be effective in redefining or 
otherwise swaying these clear and easily quantifiable interests.11   
Two level-game studies focusing on undefined public goods like security (e.g. 
Eichenberg 1993; Stein 1993; LeoGrande 1998; Knopf 1993; Trumbore 1998; Chung 2007; 
Kapur 2011) more closely fit our case.12 Although even these studies rarely place suasive 
                                                             
11 Moravcsik 1993 29 
12This suggests intersections with constructivist and Copenhagen School conceptions of security as a 
socially constructed value. See Wendt 1992 “Anarchy is What States Make of it” and Buzan 1983 People, 
States, and Fear.   
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reverberation at the center of their analyses, they can still illuminate important aspects 
of the Iran nuclear debate. For example,  Knopf’s examination of INF (intermediate 
nuclear force) talks in Western Europe shines a light on the subtle role that the alliance 
nations of two primary negotiating parties can play. Eichenberg’s analysis of the same 
issue persuasively integrates German domestic partisan politics in a way that provides 
a good model for this study. LeoGrande’s two-level evaluation of the impact of Cuban 
exile groups on Congress’s Cuba policy is usefully analogous to an examination of the 
US pro-Israel lobby’s role in the Iran debate. Most importantly, Stein’s analysis of the 
Camp David Accords is one of the few two-level studies where suasive reverberation 
plays a somewhat prominent role. Her analysis of how Sadat’s dramatic trip to 
Jerusalem favorably realigned the balance of power inside the Israeli parliament 
provides the closest analogue to the suasive reverberation examined in this paper.  
    
 Domestic Politics of US Foreign Policy 
    
This literature looks at the current state of the domestic politics of US foreign policy. A 
recent and useful overview is provided by Milner and Tingley (2015) who explain how 
the President, Congress, special-interest lobbies, bureaucracies, and public opinion 
interact to shape foreign policy. My staring point for analysis of partisan and 
ideological factors is Kupchan and Trubowitz (2007). Their description of the 
splintering of the bipartisan “liberal internationalist” compact that held for most of the 
post-WWII era captures elegantly the framework within which the Iran deal was 
debated in Congress. Building on this, Beinart (2008) and Gries (2014) lay out the case 
that the determining characteristic of present US foreign policy is not the pressures of 
the international system but partisanship, and at a deeper level, ideology, “widely 
shared and systemic beliefs about how the world does and should work”.13 Gries 
identifies two broadly opposed categories of US ideology, liberals and conservatives. 
Understanding the roots of the tension between these two camps is absolutely 
indispensable for understanding how the JCPOA battle played out in the US Congress. 
Additionally, Dueck (2010) provides a useful historical overview of the Republican 
Party’s foreign policy. Rathbun (2012) analyzes the worldview of the powerful Tea 
Party movement – uncompromising and influential opponents both of President Obama 
generally and of negotiations with Iran.     
Unfortunately, there are few substantial scholarly analyses of the Democratic 
party’s foreign policy as a whole. There is, however, a significant literature analyzing 
the linkages between liberal politics, the Democratic Party, and the American Jewish 
community that is key to understanding the Democratic reaction to the suasive 
reverberation attempts surrounding the Iran deal.   
                                                             
13 Gries 2014 5 
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 The Pro-Israel Lobby 
 
Taking Walt and Mearsheimer’s (2005) seminal work as a starting point, this study will 
also cautiously employ the controversial and polemic-tinged literature on the US pro-
Israel lobby. Oren (2011) performs a insightful Allisonian bureaucratic politics analysis 
that finds a nexus between the pro-Israel lobby and its allies in Congress as one of the 
main forces pushing the US away from negotiations and towards conflict with Iran. In a 
related vein, Beattie’s (2016) study of Congress and Middle Eastern foreign policy is 
particularly useful, as it focuses on the often-overlooked mundanities of influence over 
that body, such as phone calls, constituent letters, and VIP meetings. Another series of 
projects, notably Seliktar (2002) and more recentely Waxman (2016) trace the 
increasingly tense relations between the broadly liberal US Jewish community, the 
broadly liberal Democratic party, and the increasingly right-leaning pro-Israel lobby 
and Israeli government. This is vital to our study because, as will be explained in detail 
below, these divisions had the effect of creating political breathing room for certain 
lawmakers to approve the Iran deal.  
What the scholarly literature largely lacks, however, is a study putting suasive 
reverberation first.14 This paper, drawing on the insights of two-level games, studies of 
the politics of American foreign policy, and examinations of the pro-Israel lobby, aims 
to do just that. Making suasive reverberation the center of analysis will not only shed 
light on that topic itself, but also generate additional insights about the role of domestic 
politics, partisanship, and ideological affinities in foreign affairs more broadly.  
 
Research Findings 
 
Congressional Ratification Procedure 
 
At the time of the Iran deal, the 114th Congress, the key ratifying institution for any 
nuclear deal with Iran, was dominated by the Republican Party. They controlled the 
Senate 54 to 46 and the House by an even larger margin, 246 to 188.15 Recognizing this 
hostile reality, and having been stung before when presenting international agreements 
to Congress, President Obama initially tried to avoid playing any sort of two-level 
                                                             
14 There is an extensive literature (founding texts include Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Risse 1995, Keck 
and Sikkink 1998) that focuses on transnational advocacy, or how norms, ideologies, and ideas from 
abroad can permeate other societies and states and lead to political change. See also Haas 1992 on 
‘epistemic communities’. This project is more concerned with specific, discrete, and directly observable 
instances of lobbying perpetrated by government actors (COGs) in the form of speeches and visits linked 
to a specific international issue or crisis, instead of the more gradual and less visible processes the above 
scholars analyze.   
15 Manning 2015 
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game.16 By carefully crafting and presenting the JCPOA as a non-binding political 
commitment17 as opposed to a formal treaty or congressional-executive agreement,18 the 
Administration hoped to avoid having to seek congressional approval.19  The President 
and his legal team exploited the interstices of constitutional power, relying on a 
combination of executive orders and waiver clauses built into previously passed 
sanctions legislation to offer Iran financial relief without having to go to Congress to 
actually repeal any sanctions laws or indeed ratify the agreement in any way.20 
 However, both Democrats and Republicans resisted the President’s efforts to cut 
Congress out of the equation. Even those members who supported diplomacy with Iran 
wanted a say in the process. Congress fought to defend its relevance on a potentially 
explosive foreign policy issue.21 In mid-May 2015, approximately two months before the 
JCPOA was concluded, overwhelming bipartisan majorities (98-1 in the Senate22 and 
400-25 in the House23) passed restrictive legislation called the Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act, commonly known as ‘Corker-Cardin’ after its main authors. This nearly 
unanimous support forced the President to sign the legislation, and thus to play the 
two-level game.  
    Corker-Cardin imposed temporary restrictions on the President’s ability to 
give Iran sanctions relief through the sanctions waiver clauses mentioned above. 
Specifically, the President was not permitted to “waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief 
from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions” for a 60 day period after 
the transmittal of any agreement to Congress.24 During this 60 day period, Congress 
could block the lifting of sanctions, and hence scuttle the JCPOA, by passing a 
resolution of disapproval of the deal.  
                                                             
16 See Peake et al. 2012 on the travails of New START, President Obama’s one attempt to pass a significant 
international agreement as a formal treaty. See Skidmore 2012 on the failure of agreements like the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea to even be considered by Congress due to Republican opposition.  
17 Political commitments are essentially promises COGs make to each other, and are not legally binding 
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  See Munch 1969; Schachter 1977; and Lipson 1991. 
18 Under Article II of the US Constitution, treaties require the assent of two-thirds of the Senate. 
Congressional-executive agreements, an alternative mechanism to enact legally binding international 
agreements, require simple majorities of both the House and Senate.  
19 Obama’s behavior accords well with the so-called ‘evasion thesis’ of Lindsay 1994; Margolis 1986; and 
Nathan and Oliver 1994; which argues that Presidents seek to cut out recalcitrant legislatures through 
informal mechanisms, as well as the similar ‘stealth multilateralism’ of Kaye 2013.      
20 Rennack 2016 
21 For example, see the statement of Democratic Senator Chris Coons, as quoted in Weisman and Baker 
2015: “‘If the administration can’t persuade 34 senators of whatever party that this agreement is worth 
proceeding with, then it’s really a bad agreement.” 
22 Carney 2015 
23 French 2015 
24 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, PL 114-17 Sec. 135 B, U.S. Statutes at 
Large (2015). Accessible at https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ17/PLAW-114publ17.pdf 
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However,  Corker-Cardin was less onerous than it might have appeared. To pass 
a joint resolution of disapproval would initially require only a simple majority in both 
the House and the Senate. But the President could veto such a joint resolution, meaning 
that, following the Constitution, the bar would then be raised to a two-thirds majority 
in both Houses in order to overturn the veto. In that case, opponents of the deal would 
have to rely on significant Democratic support in both chambers. Specifically, the 
Republicans would have to gain 13 Democratic or Independent Senators and 43 
Democratic Representatives to override a veto of a negative resolution.   
In short, the Obama team was on favorable ground as they worked to drum up 
support for the JCPOA. All they had to secure was the support of 34 senators. This is 
the mirror opposite of the numbers game they would have faced if the JCPOA was 
formulated as a formal treaty.25 Because, as will be discussed below, Republican 
disapproval of a deal with Iran was virtually universal,26 Democrats were the domestic 
group targeted by all foreign parties for influence. Thus the stage was set for the debate 
in Congress over the deal, and the two examples of suasive reverberation that form the 
core of this paper.   
Before discussing these attempts, however, I will say a few words about a key 
calculation underlying the strategies of both the main foreign players as well as the 
domestic supporters and opponents of the deal. Putnam writes that the decision of 
domestic actors whether or not to ratify an international agreement is always evaluated 
in the context of the cost of ‘no-agreement’.27 The lower a player’s perceived cost of no-
agreement, the smaller her winset and thus the more selective she will be with regard to 
what agreements she finds acceptable. Conversely, the higher the perceived cost of no-
agreement, the more accepting of an imperfect bargain a player is likely to be.28  
Here, I would propose an elaboration on Putnam’s basic theory. No-agreement is 
a more complex phenomenon than it appears at first glance. Specifically, the 
permanence of no-agreement is itself a contested quality. If a deal is rejected at the 
domestic level of one of the signatory parties, no-agreement could theoretically mean a 
total end to dialogue or a prompt (or eventual) return to the negotiating table, 
depending on the particular circumstances involved.29 Perceptions of a proffered 
                                                             
25 This suggests COG strategic choice of agreement format as an important (and largely unexplored) 
factor in the two-level game. 
26 See Byrnes 2015. The one Republican senator considered a potential vote for the agreement, Jeff Flake, 
announced his opposition on August 15, 2015. In the end, no GOP representative (out of 246) supported 
the agreement either.    
27 Putnam 1988 442 
28  Id. 443 
29 Many factors might affect willingness to renegotiate after such an ‘involuntary defection’: prior 
investment of time, complexity of the issue involved, how many states or organizations are parties to the 
agreement, how close the failed agreement came to ratification, changes in regional or global political 
context that make a borderline deal more acceptable, a change in COG leadership, and a electoral 
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bargain’s finality are key to understanding domestic evaluations of the cost of no-
agreement. Opponents of the JCPOA had a low estimate of the cost of no-agreement 
because they argued that Iran could easily be forced back to the negotiating table if the 
JCPOA was rejected.30 The Obama administration, in contrast, went to great lengths to 
depict the JCPOA as final and rate the cost of no-agreement as high as possible.31  
  This explains the most consistent theme the Obama administration used, that 
the rejection of the JCPOA would lead to war. In his most prominent speech on the 
agreement, the President stated “Let’s not mince words: The choice we face is 
ultimately between diplomacy and some form of war — maybe not tomorrow, maybe 
not three months from now, but soon” and that “Congressional rejection of this deal 
leaves any U.S. administration that is absolutely committed to preventing Iran from 
getting a nuclear weapon with one option — another war in the Middle East”.32  This 
message was echoed by Secretary of State John Kerry and the administration’s allies in 
Congress.  Specifically, the President targeted Democrats by linking the potential failure 
of the JCPOA’s diplomatic efforts with Iran to the 2003 failure of diplomatic overtures 
to Iraq that eventually led to invasion and a highly unpopular war.33  
Unsurprisingly, those opposed to the JCPOA disputed this framing of the issue 
and accused Obama of presenting a false choice between a bad deal and war.34 Both 
sides put so much emphasis on these competing narratives of no-agreement because 
both realized that this evaluation, and not necessarily the specifics of the JCPOA itself, 
would likely be the deciding factor in the minds of the group of legislators that would 
decide the fate of the deal. Consider the position of wavering Democrats: voting for a 
necessarily imperfect compromise agreement with a distrusted pariah state is hardly a 
political walk in the park. If these legislators were convinced that the JCPOA could 
realistically be renegotiated and strengthened to the benefit of the US and Israel, they 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
realignment among domestic players, among others. See Faure and Zartman 2012 at 8, who make the key 
point that negotiations failure can be “classified according to the degree of immobility of the process”.    
30 This was perhaps the most common theme in opposition to the JCPOA. Critics repeatedly urged the US 
to push for “a better deal” (Senator McConnell, quoted in Cornwell 2015) or to go “back to the 
negotiating table” (e.g. the statement of Rep. Trott, accessible at https://trott.house.gov/Iran).   
31 For example, Secretary Kerry said that: “It is a presumption there that Iran will come back and 
renegotiate. But that's not going to happen” and that if the JCPOA was rejected, “the United States 
Congress will prove the ayatollah’s suspicion, and there’s no way he’s ever coming back” (as quoted in 
Goldberg 2015). Treasury Secretary Jack Lew claimed that the idea of forcing Iran back to the table 
through intensified sanctions was “a dangerous fantasy, flying in the face of economic and diplomatic 
reality” (Lew 2015). 
32 Obama 2015 
33 For example, the President argued that “many of the same people who argued for the war in Iraq are 
now making the case against the Iran nuclear deal” Obama 2015 
34 Senator Coats’ comments are representative: "We must ignore the coming public relations campaign 
that will trumpet this deal as a victory for diplomacy and the false premise that the deal is a choice 
between peace and war" (quoted in Walsh and Barret 2015).  
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would likely follow the path of least political resistance and reject it. Consider the 
words of one key Democratic senator: “If I thought there were a better deal possible, 
and a determined effort really could force all our key allies back to the table, that would 
be my preferred course” and “If members really believed there was a better deal 
waiting in the wings, they would have voted no”.35  
To forestall this eventuality, the Obama administration strategically employed 
foreign suasive reverberation to underscore the cost of no-agreement. Fascinatingly, the 
White House was also opposed in this effort by significant foreign suasive reverberation 
aimed at minimizing the perceived cost of no-agreement and thus killing the deal. The 
next section of this paper will discuss these opposing lobbying efforts. It will then 
conduct an in-depth analysis of the lengthy public statements issued by each 
Democratic Senator announcing and justifying their decisions. These statements show 
that foreign suasive reverberation was key to the ultimate survival of the JCPOA in 
Congress.     
 
Suasive Reverberation: Israel 
 
Opposition to the JCPOA stemmed from a nexus between the Republican Party, the 
state of Israel, and various US pro-Israel lobbying organizations.36 Most famously, 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in a fascinating attempt at suasive 
reverberation, addressed an extremely high-profile joint session of Congress in March 
2015 to try and convince that body to reject the still un-finalized deal. Put in context, 
this was roughly two months before the final approval of Corker-Cardin, and 
approximately four and half months before the JCPOA was actually concluded in 
Vienna.  
 Netanyahu must have known that the agreement was already opposed 
virtually unanimously by Republicans, who did not require any suasive reverberation 
to vote against it. This means that if Netanyahu was interested in more than just 
preaching to the choir, there were only two feasible (but not necessarily mutually 
exclusive) rationales for seeking such a dramatic venue for his address: either 
Netanyahu must have thought that his lobbying would raise pressure on wavering 
                                                             
35  Sen. Chris Coons, as quoted in Peterson and Lee 2015. 
36 See Oren 2012; Beattie 2015. This paper will examine only the most prominent example of official 
reverberation attempts from the Israeli government, Netanyahu’s speech. Unfortunately, space precludes 
an in-depth analysis of the visits of ambassador Ron Dermer to key congressmen. Also, various US 
domestic groups like ‘Citizens for a Nuclear Free Iran’ paid for millions of dollars of advertisements 
designed to pressure vulnerable Democrats to kill any Iran deal (O’Connor 2015). Despite the intimate 
links of these organizations to Israel, their lobbying cannot be unambiguously defined as foreign suasive 
reverberation, and so will not be analyzed here.   
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Democrats and tip the scales against the agreement, or he saw his speech as a useful 
device to shore up his re-election chances back in Israel.37  
The latter possibility, although fascinating in and of itself, is outside the scope of 
this essay. The former is evidenced by the fact that the central strategy of the address 
was to attempt to narrow Congressional win-sets by lowering the perceived cost of no-
agreement. This was a strategy completely wasted on Republicans, who were 
unconcerned with the cost of no-agreement. It was, however, carefully designed to 
appeal to wavering Democrats distrustful of a deal with Iran and fearful of any adverse 
geo-political and electoral consequences of supporting the deal,  but loath to oppose 
their President and worried that no-agreement might lead to another Middle Eastern 
war. 
 It is not necessary to read between the lines to discover this strategy in 
Netanyahu’s speech. Netanyahu directly confronted “the argument that there's no 
alternative to this deal” by claiming that “Iran's nuclear program can be rolled back 
well beyond the current proposal by insisting on a better deal and keeping up the 
pressure on a very vulnerable regime”. Netanyahu overtly minimized the cost and 
likelihood of Iran rejecting a tougher deal: “Now, if Iran threatens to walk away from 
the table — and this often happens in a Persian bazaar — call their bluff. They'll be 
back, because they need the deal a lot more than you do”. Netanyahu argued that “no 
deal is better than a bad deal” and that “the alternative to this bad deal is a much better 
deal”. Netanyahu then ended his address with a list of characteristics of this “better 
deal”.38  
This speech represented Netanyahu’s recognition of the emerging outlines of the 
debate over the JCPOA in Congress. It constituted a pre-emptive strike against the 
Administration’s likely rejoinder stressing the high cost of no-agreement. President 
Obama indeed responded to Netanyahu’s address in precisely these terms, saying that 
“the alternative that the Prime Minister offers is no deal, in which case Iran will 
immediately begin once again pursuing its nuclear program”.39  
If the main objective of Netanyahu’s speech was to stoke Democratic opposition 
to the deal, it was, with the benefit of hindsight, counterproductive, and offers a 
quintessential example of negative suasive reverberation. In layman’s terms, Netanyahu 
provoked a backlash. His central strategy – to attempt to shrink the win-set of 
Democrats by de-emphasizing the cost of no-agreement – fell on deaf ears. On the most 
basic level, few Democrats, or at least few Democrats that were previously undecided, 
bought his arguments. His strategy failed because it played neatly into a Democratic 
                                                             
37 A critical and closely contested Israeli election was scheduled for two weeks after his address. 
Netanyahu’s Likud narrowly won and was able to form a government. See Rudoren 2015.   
38 The full text of Netanyahu’s speech is accessible online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2015/03/03/full-text-netanyahus-address-to-congress/ 
39 As quoted in Baker 2015. 
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suspicion that the opponents of a deal with Iran were simply tearing down the 
President’s proposals without offering anything constructive as a replacement.  
For example, Sen. Barbara Boxer stated that “He [Netanyahu] seemed to say that 
there was no way [to] ever trust Iran. Which says to me you can’t have a deal with Iran. 
And then he said, ‘Well, why don’t you work for a better deal?’ So it was confusing”.40 
Likewise, Rep. John Yarmuth stated that “Prime Minister Netanyahu basically said that 
the only acceptable deal was a perfect deal, or an ideal deal” adding that “It’s like the 
child that says, I want to go to Disneyland every day, eat ice cream and drink Coca-Cola 
every day, and not go to school”.41 Rep. Lloyd Dogget said that “He [Netanyahu] is a 
rejectionist. There is no agreement that this administration could achieve with Iran that 
would be good enough for him”.42 This sort of reaction to Netanyahu’s speech was not 
confined to those Democrats perceived as having only lukewarm ties to Netanyahu or 
to Israel. Rep. Brad Sherman, a noted Israel hawk, agreed with Netanyahu that “This 
[emerging Iran agreement] is a bad deal,” but added that “He [Netanyahu] showed us 
why this deal is a bad deal. The alternative to a bad deal is we’re in a bad situation. And 
he did not give us a clear road map to a good deal”.43   
 Why were Congressional Democrats so suspicious and distrustful of Netanyahu, 
the longtime leader of one of the US’s closest allies? There are two interlocking second-
order explanations: the more superficial contends that the manner of the speech’s 
arrangement offended Democrats and led to a ‘rally ‘round the President’ effect that 
increased support for the deal. On a deeper (but related) level, the speech might also 
have backfired because of an emerging partisan split on Israel, or, more precisely, a 
partisan split on an Israel increasingly dominated by right-wing political forces.  
The first explanation is relatively straightforward. Congressional Democrats had 
reason to be upset with Netanyahu because, in an action without precedent in US 
history, he had come to criticize a sitting President in a speech to Congress that had 
been arranged through secret consultations with Republican leaders without the 
notification of any Democrats or the Administration.44 It was also no secret to 
Congressional Democrats that Netanyahu and the Likud Party generally were no 
friends of their President, had consistently frustrated his policy aims in the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, and had openly supported his Republican opponents in past Presidential 
                                                             
40 As quoted in DeBonis 2015, an article headlined “Decrying ‘Insult,’ House Democrats Seethe After 
Netanyahu Address”.  
41 House Democratic Press Conference, 3 March 2015. Transcript accessible online at http://www.c-
span.org/video/?324646-1/house-democrats-response-prime-minister-netanyahu-address-congress 
42 Id. 
43 As quoted in Rogers 2015, headlined “Reaction to Netanyahu Speech Divides Along Partisan Lines”.   
44 See Ravid 2015 for a detailed account. The idea for the speech apparently originated with House 
Republican Speaker John Boehner  and was “swiftly and positively” accepted by Netanyahu, with Israel’s 
ambassador to the US, Ron Dermer, acting as a go-between.      
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elections.45 Approximately seventeen percent of Senate Democrats and more than 
twenty-five percent of House Democrats even refused to attend the speech at all in 
response to what they viewed as a political stunt and a personal snub to the President.46 
It is likely that the minority who took the overt step of refusing to attend or of issuing 
public criticism represented the tip of the iceberg of Democratic dissatisfaction with the 
speech. Netanyahu had to sway Democrats to have a chance at blocking the deal, but 
his speech and visit to Washington were arranged through connivance with their bitter 
political rivals. This mismatch between target group and methodological approach (the 
mechanical how of suasive reverberation) didn’t bode well for the success of 
Netanyahu’s appeals.  
  The second reason Netanyahu’s speech was unsuccessful requires a deeper look 
into contemporary US-Israel relations. Tellingly, many of the negative statements on the 
speech were careful to emphasize their affection for Israel but not for Netanyahu 
himself. For example, Rep. Steve Cohen said that “Netanyahu is not Israel just like 
George W. Bush wasn’t America”.47 This is a revealing quote, because the need for such 
a protestation subtly indicates the contrary: despite the requisite declarations of 
enduring, everlasting support for Israel, the policies of Netanyahu, Likud, and the 
Israeli right were increasingly driving Democrats away from policy lockstep with the 
Jewish state. Many liberals increasingly view an Israel dominated by such parties as no 
longer genuinely interested in peace with the Palestinians,48 bent on expanding the 
deeply controversial settlements49 and even preaching open racism against Israel’s Arab 
minority.50 These developments represented severe cognitive dissonance for a liberal 
party like the Democrats.51 According to this explanation, the negative reaction to 
Netanyahu’s speech cannot be divorced from the Democratic party’s perceptions that  
the right-wing  government of Israel had formed a de facto alliance with the party in the 
                                                             
45 The two have clashed on Israel’s settlement policy, the peace process generally, Netanyahu’s comments 
about Israel’s minority citizens, the Iran deal, and the proper response to the Arab Spring, among other 
issues. See Shalev 2016, which describes Netanyahu and Obama as having “the most dysfunctional 
relationship on earth”, and Goldberg 2016, which describes the disappointment Obama feels for 
Netanyahu to be “in a category of its own”.  Netanyahu even arranged a high-profile visit to Israel for 
Obama’s 2012 Republican Presidential opponent, Mitt Romney, whom Netanyahu has been friendly with 
since the 1970s when the two worked at the same consulting firm. His actions infuriated Obama, who 
viewed Netanyahu as actively aiding Romney’s election attempts. See Ravid 2012 for an analysis.  
46 Calculations performed by the author, using data from Jaffe 2015.    
47 As quoted in Weisman 2015, an article titled “Netanyahu’s Visit Bringing Uninvited Problems for 
Jewish Democrats”. 
48 Ravid 2015b 
49 Rudoren and Ashkenas 2015 
50 Eglash 2015 
51 See Seliktar 2002; Waxman 2016 
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US that shared its alliances with religious fundamentalists, disinterest in the peace 
process and distaste for international opinion – the Republicans.52  
In sum, Netanyahu’s speech only reinforced for Democrats the perception that 
the Iran deal was a choice between allegiance to a Democratic President and loyalty to a 
foreign nation increasingly distant ideologically and seemingly aligned with the 
Republican Party.53  
It is difficult to speak with absolute certainty, but virtually no statements or other 
documentary evidence show that Netanyahu’s speech convinced any Congressperson 
not already opposed to the Iran agreement, and considerable evidence suggests he 
actually hurt his own cause. For example, the bad blood fostered by Netanyahu’s 
speech might have been a factor in several more hawkish Democrats changing their 
prior positions and promising to hold off on imposing new sanctions before an 
important negotiating deadline for the Iran deal.54 One anonymous pro-Israel activist 
was quoted as saying “that there was a chance of actually reaching a veto-proof 
majority” in favor of a new sanctions bill, but that Netanyahu’s conduct, which the 
activist called “scary” and a “huge error” led to its defeat.55 Greg Rosenbaum, chairman 
of the National Jewish Democratic Council and a proponent of a deal with Iran, said 
that the Netanyahu visit “made it easier for him to drum up support among lawmakers 
for giving the administration time to negotiate with Iran”.56 Perhaps the best summary 
came from an anonymous official with AIPAC, the powerful pro-Israel lobbying 
committee: “Netanyahu’s speech in Congress made the Iranian issue a partisan one […] 
As soon as he insisted on going ahead with this move, which was perceived as a 
Republican maneuver against the President, we lost a significant part of the Democratic 
party, without which it was impossible to block the agreement”.57   
 The Netanyahu speech contretemps illustrates how mishandled attempts at 
foreign suasive reverberation can trigger a backlash, even in states with such close 
historical and cultural ties as Israel and the US. Putnam states that “Negative 
reverberation is probably less common empirically than positive reverberation, simply 
                                                             
52 See a 2014 Pew study finding that “since the 1970s, the partisan gap in Mideast sympathies has never 
been wider” accessible online at http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/07/7-15-14-Israel-and-Palestine-
release.pdf.   
53 Avishai 2015 notes that both Netanyahu and his chosen ambassador to the US, Ron Dermer, have 
extensive contacts with the Republican Party and few with Democrats. He goes so far as to argue that “in 
their wars of ideas and political networks, Netanyahu’s Likud and his American supporters are an 
integral part of the Republican Party’s camp, and Israel is too involved in the American political 
landscape and defense establishment for Netanyahu to be considered as distant as a foreign leader”.  
54 Id.  
55 See Guttman 2015 “Why Israel Lobby is Biggest Casualty of Feud over Benjamin Netanyahu’s Speech” 
56 Mufson 2015 
57 Avishai 2015b. AIPAC later distanced itself from these comments, saying that they did not represent 
the organization’s official views.   
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because foreigners are likely to forgo public pressure if it is recognized to be 
counterproductive”.58 This suggests that Netanyahu miscalculated, unsurprising 
considering that attempts at suasive reverberation are necessarily conducted with 
incomplete information.59  
As we see above, the root of Netanyahu’s miscalculation was his  
underestimation of the partisan split towards him personally and towards the right-
wing turn in Israeli government generally. Putnam’s original article limits itself to 
observation that suasive reverberation emanating from a “source […] generally viewed 
by domestic audiences as an adversary rather than an ally [is] more likely to be 
perceived as negative”.60 But this statement can be sharpened. Unspoken is the 
implication that domestic partisan and ideological alignments play a key role in the 
reception of suasive reverberation attempts.  
Specifically, in many nations, including the US, there are sharp internal 
divergences on attitudes towards certain states. A nation one domestic faction favors 
might be met with ambivalence or outright hostility by a different faction. For example, 
in a trend that burgeoned after 9/11 and especially after the 2003 Iraq War, the 
contemporary Republican Party has consistently criticized ‘European elites’, ‘European 
socialism’, and ‘Old Europe’, with France and the Scandinavian nations receiving 
particular mockery as godless, snobbish and emasculated welfare paradises.61 This 
visceral disdain has complex roots that are beyond the scope of this essay, but its effects 
can easily be discerned in Republican foreign policy actions and statements, most 
famously the Bush Administration’s disdain for and complete rejection of European 
attempts to avert war with Iraq in 2003.  
It seems reasonable to argue that attempts at suasive reverberation from foreign 
powers are less likely to succeed if the domestic group targeted is historically 
ambivalent or actively hostile to the source. Consider this hypothetical: In the run-up to 
the 2003 Iraq War, if Democrats had secretly invited Jaques Chirac to Washington to 
                                                             
58 Putnam 1988 456 
59 Harsayni 1967; Milner 1997. While leaders who attempt suasive reverberation have strong knowledge 
of their own internal coalitions and motivating forces, their perception of their target’s circumstances is 
likely to be incomplete, even if, like Netanyahu, they have been sophisticated political observers of the 
target nation over many decades.  
60 Putnam 1988  
61 Kahler 2005 shows how a close relationship with Europe was once “the least controversial element in 
American foreign policy” and a bipartisan “sacred cow”, but has since become a wedge issue. Kahler 
traces this development to American domestic politics. He concludes that “Republican administrations 
have had more troubled relationships with European allies than Democratic administrations” and “the 
more conservative the administration, the sharper the conflict”.       
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speak out against the impending invasion, how many House and Senate Republicans 
would likely have been persuaded?62   
 Suasive reverberation probably only very rarely results in drastic shifts from one 
end of a given issue’s political pendulum to the other. As the following section on P5 + 1 
reverberation will illustrate, in situations governed by high levels of partisanship, 
foreign suasive reverberation is more effective at the margins. Its usefulness lies chiefly 
in pressuring ambivalent or conflicted members within a ‘friendly’ party or domestic 
constituency that might be tempted to defect or abstain.  
The European example is of course an imperfect analogy. The Democratic image 
of Israel has not reached, nor is likely to reach in the near future, the caricature of 
Europe that many Republicans seem to have internalized. However, Netanyahu’s well-
publicized antagonism with President Obama, his settlement policy, and his other 
controversial actions have accelerated the process of uncoupling the Democratic party 
from reflexive alignment with Israel.  Netanyahu failed to recognize this changing 
reality, and as a result, his attempts at suasive reverberation by narrowing 
Congressional Democrat’s winsets were perceived by many Democrats as attempts to 
destroy President Obama’s good-faith attempts at negotiations without offering 
anything constructive in their place. Unsurprisingly, this was not a winning strategy.     
In sum, partisan perception of foreign powers can function as the medium 
through which foreign suasive reverberation is interpreted.  This suggests that foreign 
leaders who overtly align themselves with one domestic political faction are playing a 
dangerous game. If they miscalculate, they can lose more in political support from the 
other side of the aisle than they gain in the unquestioned allegiance of their domestic 
suitor. It seems likely this tendency would be particularly pronounced in nations with 
two dominant and roughly equally powerful parties like the US, the UK, Canada, and 
Australia. This is because if two political factions represent virtually the only outlets for 
political expression, overt alignment with one represents the writing off of roughly half 
the balance of political forces in the state.  
Indeed, the success of Israel in influencing the American behemoth for more than 
half a century was predicated on bipartisanship.63 As numerous commentators have 
pointed out, in the long term, it would prove extremely costly for Israel to lose the 
undivided support of the United States by alienating one of its two major parties.64 
Netanyahu’s ungainly attempt – and ultimate failure – to stop the Iran deal represented 
a significant step down this road. This is why centrist pro-Israel advocates, including 
                                                             
62 President Obama posed this very hypothetical during an interview addressing Netanyahu’s speech, 
accessible online at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-obama-transcript-idUSKBN0LY2J820150302  
63 See Cavari and Nyer 2014 for a comprehensive study of past bipartisan congressional support for Israel, 
and a glimpse into an emerging split they label “congressional dysergia”. 
64 For example, See Judis 2015 “The Breakup” and Horowitz 2015 “Do the Democrats and Israel Have a 
Future Together?”. 
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Abraham Foxman, head of the Anti-Defamation League, and Michael Oren,  
Netanyahu’s former ambassador to the US, called for the speech to be cancelled.65 They 
recognized danger and the potential for a backlash, even when Netanyahu himself did 
not. 
Suasive Reverberation: the P5 + 1 Nations 
The final form of the nuclear agreement with Iran was reached in Vienna on July 14th, 
2015. Six days later, the Obama Administration formally transmitted the JCPOA to 
Congress, triggering Corker-Cardin’s 60-day review period. Both sides mobilized, 
focusing primarily on the Senate.66 This paper contends that the pivotal date for 
securing enough Democratic support to ensure the JCPOA’s survival was August 4th. 
On that day, the ambassadors of all the foreign P5 + 1 negotiating states (the UK, France, 
Germany, Russia, and China) met with 25 to 30 Democratic Senators on Capitol Hill in 
an extraordinary attempt to convince them to support the agreement.  This meeting was 
only the most prominent part of a coordinated lobbying campaign by the P5 + 1 powers 
(especially its European members), whose ambassadors and deputy mission chiefs 
crisscrossed Washington in the months leading up to the JCPOA vote.  In parallel to our 
discussion of Israel’s efforts, this analysis will recount only official P5 + 1 attempts at 
suasive reverberation, with the August 4th meeting as a focal point.67 Within the P5 + 1, 
it will concentrate on the European nations, although Russia and China also played 
important but less high-profile roles. 
 European states had ample reason to press strongly for the JCPOA’s survival. 
After all, these nations had begun the negotiation process with Iran in 2003, and were 
determined to see their more than decade-long odyssey to a successful end. They 
viewed the deal on its merits as positive for the security of the EU (which was much 
closer to a potential Iranian nuclear threat than the US) as well as for Israel.68 To varying 
degrees, Russia, China, and the nations of the EU, particularly Germany, had also 
foregone fruitful economic links with Iran by imposing their own sanctions designed to 
                                                             
65 See Haaretz 2015 and Guttman 2015b 
66 Enough Democratic votes in either the House or the Senate would have guaranteed the deal’s survival. 
The Obama administration probably focused its lobbying efforts on the Senate for the practical reason 
that it was easier to gauge the support of and tailor messages to a relatively small group of senators than 
to the much larger and more heterogeneous House Democratic caucus.  
67 An extraordinary Washington Post editorial in favor of the deal coauthored by the leaders of Germany, 
France and the UK will not be discussed at length here because it was published after the critical mass to 
ensure the deal’s survival was achieved. See https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/cameron-
hollande-and-merkel-why-we-support-the-iran-deal/2015/09/10/a1ce6610-5735-11e5-b8c9-
944725fcd3b9_story.html?postshare=5081441905624312 
68 See the above-referenced editorial:  “Israel’s security matters are, and will remain, our key interests, too. 
We would not have reached the nuclear deal with Iran if we did not think that it removed a threat to the 
region and the non-proliferation regime as a whole.” 
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lead to the JCPOA, and were eager to see normal trade ties restored, especially energy 
links.69 There was also a complete absence of the domestic debate roiling the US; 
European publics and parties were virtually unanimous in support of a deal with Iran.70 
   The August 4th meeting on Capitol Hill was arranged by Dick Durbin, a 
Democratic senator from Illinois (President Obama’s home state) with long-standing 
personal ties to the White House. Durbin was also the Senate minority whip, a position 
responsible for ensuring party unity and discipline. In short, he was the ideal liaison 
between the Administration and the Senate.71 It is hard to imagine that such a meeting 
occurred without extensive coordination between congressional allies, the heads of state 
of the P5 + 1, and the White House. These networks gave the P5 + 1 privileged access to 
Democratic senators. The date of the meeting, the day before President Obama’s main 
speech in support of the agreement at American University, suggests that it was a 
carefully timed part of a larger roll-out effort. Indeed, the P5 + 1 meeting and the 
messages it delivered apparently followed a “communications game plan” crafted by 
the US and European nations at the conclusion of negotiations in Vienna.72 This alone is 
fascinating because it suggests that suasive reverberation was such an integral part of 
the deal that it was discussed alongside the negotiation of the substantive content of the 
agreement itself.   
What has emerged from the August 4th meeting makes it clear that the P5 + 1’s  
strategy for suasive reverberation was the mirror image of Netanyahu’s. Their goal was 
to foreclose the easy way out for wavering Democratic senators – the tempting idea that 
the JCPOA could be rejected and that Iran would return to the negotiating table, and 
that more diplomacy, not war, would ensue. The ambassadors aimed to convince 
Democratic senators that if the JCPOA were rejected, they would not fight for ‘a better 
deal’. Instead, the message of the P5 + 1 nations, anticipating the President’s the next 
day, was that Congressional rejection would mean that support for the international 
sanctions regime would collapse in Europe, China, and Russia, and that the Iranians 
would not return to the negotiating table but would instead likely accelerate their 
nuclear program. In short, the P5 + 1’s role was to emphasize the high cost of no-
agreement and thus expand the winsets of Democratic senators.     
                                                             
69 See Patterson 2013; Shirvani and Vuković 2015. Unlike the US, which has not had significant trade with 
Iran since the 1979 Revolution, the EU sacrificed a significant financial relationship with Iran by signing 
on to sanctions.  One estimate by a pro-deal organization put Germany’s losses between 2010 and 2012 
alone at between $23.1 and $73.0 billion dollars, and France’s at between $10.9 and $34.2 billion dollars.   
See NIAC report, accessible at http://www.niacouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Losing-Billions-
The-Cost-of-Iran-Sanctions.pdf 
70 Bohlen 2015, “Europe Doesn’t Share U.S. Concerns on Iran Deal” 
71 See DeBonis 2015, “How Sen. Durbin Spent His Summer Saving the Iran Deal” for details.  
72 Crowley 2015, headlined “Old Europe pushes Iran Deal On Capitol Hill” 
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No transcript of the closed-door meeting was taken, but the basic outline of  
what was said can be reconstructed through journalistic accounts, the public remarks of 
P5 + 1 officials, and an analysis of Democratic senators’ statements in support of the 
deal. According to a report73 in Foreign Policy magazine, during the meeting, “a 
number of Democrats expressed genuine confusion about how world powers would 
react if Congress rejected the deal, and whether a ‘better deal’ could be struck in the 
future.” The P5 + 1 diplomats then “pushed back” against this suggestion. The British 
ambassador, Peter Westmacott, told the senators that the chances of getting a better deal 
were “far-fetched”. He also speculated that the global sanctions regime against Tehran 
would fall apart if Congress blocked the JCPOA – a view that was seconded by Russian 
Ambassador Sergey Kislyak. The arguments the ambassadors made during the meeting 
almost certainly paralleled their many public statements. For example, on another 
occasion, Ambassador Peter Witting of Germany stated that:  “I think many of the 
emerging countries would consider Congress blocking this deal as – maybe as a trigger 
to at least question the present sanctions regime[…][If] the international community 
comes to the conclusion that it's not Iran that is to blame, then the international 
solidarity that has been quite strong on the recent years would most probably erode.”74  
Ample evidence suggests that this attempt to broaden Democratic win-sets by 
emphasizing the cost of no-agreement worked. Although it is impossible to quantify 
just how important the P5 + 1 strategy was for senators weighing a host of competing 
demands, a mass of anecdotal evidence suggests that it was a decisive factor.75 Even if 
the P5 + 1’s message was privately considered by Democrats as “not intellectually valid 
but politically useful”,76 it still provided the necessary cover to vote yes and thus 
guaranteed the survival of the agreement.  
Almost every Democratic senator released a public statement explaining his or 
her decision on the JCPOA. Usually, a senator’s statement on votes, even on highly 
controversial topics, are short and rarely contain in depth-analysis or argumentation 
beyond the soundbite level. Luckily for us, however, the statements Democrats released 
in response to the Iran deal took the form of heavily researched cri de cœurs. For 
example, Senator Bob Casey’s statement  – surely breaking some kind of Senate record – 
was over seven thousand words long. These documents offer an invaluable glimpse 
into the mindsets and motivations of Democrats concerning the Iran deal and the 
competing attempts at suasive reverberation surrounding it.   
                                                             
73 Hudson 2015, headlined “P5+1 Nations Press Senate Democrats to Support Iran Deal” 
74 Panel discussion at the Atlantic Council, Washington DC, 28 May 2015. Accessible online at 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/europe-and-the-iran-nuclear-deal 
75 See comments by Democratic senators in DeBonis 2015: “That meeting [with the P5 +1] was as close to a 
turning point as there was in the Senate, because the ambassadors were clear as day in their assessment 
that there would be no second negotiation.”   
76 Putnam 455 
 23 
 
42 Democratic and independent senators voted in favor of the JCPOA. Of these, 
27 (64%) explicitly cited the meeting with the P5 + 1 ambassadors in their explanatory 
statements.77 This squares perfectly with the estimated number of senators at the 
meeting, suggesting that virtually every Senator who attended was swayed by the P5 + 
1’s strategy. Due to space limitations, not every statement can be reproduced here, but it 
is important to stress that those that follow below are not cherry-picked examples. The 
great majority of Democratic senators seem to have accepted some variation of the P5 + 
1’s arguments.  
Sen. Franken, for instance, wrote that “some say that, should the Senate reject 
this agreement, we would be in position to negotiate a ‘better’ one. But I've spoken to 
representatives of the five nations that helped broker the deal, and they agree that this 
simply wouldn't be the case.”78 Sen. Klobuchar said that she “recently met with the 
Ambassadors representing the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China, 
and not one of them believed that abandoning this deal would result in a better deal”.79 
Sen. Gillibrand stated: “In a meeting earlier this week when I questioned the 
ambassadors of our P5+1 allies, it also became clear that if we reject this deal, going 
back to the negotiation table is not an option”.80 Sen. Hirono cited this intriguing 
exchange when she explained her positive vote: “In fact, at a recent meeting of leaders 
from our partner nations, I specifically asked the Ambassadors to the U.S. from China, 
the United Kingdom, and Russia whether their countries would come back to negotiate 
again should the U.S. walk away from the deal. They unanimously said, ‘No’, that there 
was already a deal – the one before Congress.”81 
Importantly, the August 4th meeting was also a factor in swaying Democrats 
from conservative or battleground states where their seats were more vulnerable to 
potential Republican challengers. For example, Sen. Bill Nelson of Florida argued that 
“If the United States kills the deal that most of the rest of the world is for, there is no 
question in this Senator’s mind that the sanctions will start to erode, and they may 
collapse altogether. We just had a meeting with all the P5 + 1 Ambassadors to the 
United States, and they reaffirmed that exact fact”.82 Sen. Bob Casey, of the key swing 
state of Pennsylvania, not only cited the P5 + 1 meeting in his statement but even 
                                                             
77 Calculations performed by the author in a comprehensive analysis of every senatorial statement.  
78 Statement accessible at http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/13/opinions/franken-iran-deal/ 
79 Statement accessible at http://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/2015/8/senator-amy-klobuchar-s-
statement-on-iran-nuclear-agreement 
80 Statement accessible at https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/gillibrand-why-im-
supporting-an-imperfect-iran-deal 
81 Statement accessible at https://www.hirono.senate.gov/press-releases/statement-from-us-senator-
mazie-k-hirono-on-the-iran-nuclear-agreement 
82 Statement accessible at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2015-08-04/pdf/CREC-2015-08-04-pt1-
PgS6263-2.pdf#page=2 6264-6266 
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directly reproduced within it a quote from the UK Deputy Head of Mission in support 
of the deal.83   
An even greater number of senators, 38, or 90% of yes votes, employed 
arguments that echoed the thrust of the P5 + 1’s rhetoric, even if they did not cite the 
August 4th meeting explicitly. This suggests that the P5 + 1’s argument spread widely 
within the Democratic caucus and filtered down even to Senators who did not attend 
the meeting. For instance, Sen. Shaheen stated that “If we walk away from this 
agreement, we’ll see the sanctions regime fall apart, we will be there by ourselves, and 
Iran will continue its march to a nuclear weapon”.84  Sen. Schatz argued that “We do not 
have the luxury of being able to pick this deal apart. The United States negotiated this 
deal with the other major world powers; and if we walk away now, the multilateral 
sanctions that the United States helped put in place to bring Iran to the negotiating table 
will certainly crumble”.85  
Finally, the timing of many Democratic senator’s announcements provides 
circumstantial evidence that the P5 + 1 meeting was a decisive factor. Before August 4th, 
only four Senators had publicly announced their support for the JCPOA. Within four 
days of the P5 +1 meeting, ten senators announced their support. 38 of 42 yes votes  
(over 90%) were announced on or after the day of the meeting. Of course, the mere date 
that these statements were issued does not prove causation, and it is understandable 
that many senators delayed a decision on this difficult topic until the last possible 
moment. However, when the timing depicted in the below chart is combined with the 
content of the senators’ statements, August 4th clearly emerges as a turning point in the 
fight over the JCPOA.  
 
                                                             
83 Statement accessible at https://www.casey.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/casey-statement-on-iran-
agreement-full 
84 Statement accessible at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/news/press/release/?id=71222814-e95e-4022-
b832-3a9847b42600 
85 Statement accessible at http://www.schatz.senate.gov/press-releases/schatz-statement-on-iran-nuclear-
agreement 
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Why were the P5 + 1 so successful? On the most basic level, we can say that their 
arguments were simply more compelling than Israel’s, and that the JCPOA’s naysayers 
never offered a better alternative. This is all well and good, but, as with the Israeli 
attempts, it is worth exploring the broader context within which the P5 + 1 appeals were 
interpreted. Such an investigation can perhaps suggest why the P5 + 1 succeeded where 
Israel failed.   
First, it is important to note that the attempts at suasive reverberation were 
coming from sources – Western Europe specifically, and the international community  
more broadly – that the target group was already inclined to respect. Democrats and 
liberals, in sharp contrast to Republicans and conservatives, generally ascribe 
substantial importance to multilateral diplomacy, institutional cooperation, and the will 
of the international community, especially with regard to arms control.86 Tellingly, with 
the sole exception of Israel, conservatives express less favorable views than liberals of 
nearly every country in the world.87 This is an ideological phenomenon of long 
standing, dating back at least to the formative period of modern American foreign 
policy after the end of World War II.88   
The role that Western Europe (with the exception of the UK) and the world 
community performed in opposing the Iraq War would also have resonated favorably 
in the minds of undecided Democratic senators. The debate over the Iran deal 
resurrected lingering memories of the previous presidency, with the Bush 
administration’s ‘with us or against us’ mentality, disdain for diplomacy and 
international institutions, and vigorous unilateralism. It is likely that many Democrats 
were wary of a rush to war of 2003 vintage and reluctant to align themselves with many 
of the individuals responsible for that effort, who, coincidentally or not, were mostly 
those leading the charge against the JCPOA.89 These circumstances left Democrats 
especially unenthusiastic about rejecting a diplomatic option supported nearly 
unanimously by the global community.  These conditions – general affinities with and 
respect for Western Europe nations and international opinion, a belief in the value of 
diplomacy, and the specific historical legacies of the recent past – made Democrats 
highly vulnerable targets for suasive reverberation emanating from the P5 + 1. Putnam 
said as much when he proposed “that international pressure is more likely to 
reverberate negatively if its source is generally viewed by domestic audiences as an 
                                                             
86 For example, see Busby et al. 2012, (although their conclusions are antithetical to my argument, their 
data is not) accessible at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2012-05-30/american-
foreign-policy-already-post-partisan, especially the section on “principles”.  This trend also holds beyond 
the US, see Rathbun 2004. 
87 See Gries 2014, “Introduction”.    
88  Id.  
89 Some examples include Netanyahu himself, neoconservative intellectuals like William Kristol, former 
Vice President Dick Cheney, and many others.  
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adversary rather than an ally”90 but the interesting thing here is the unpacking of the 
term “domestic audiences” to mean political parties and ideological coalitions.     
This episode suggests that suasive reverberation attempts targeted at liberals are 
more likely to be effective the more multilateral they are, especially if they seem to 
encompass virtually the entire global community of nations. The P5 + 1 did not say 
anything truly novel during their Capitol Hill visits — they simply echoed the Obama 
administration’s previous arguments — but they provided vital credibility for those 
claims. Instead of having to take the President’s word on what the reaction of the US’s 
sanctions partners would be to a Congressional rejection of the JCPOA, Democrats 
could hear directly from the relevant nations themselves. As one British diplomat who 
attended the Capitol Hill meeting put it: “It's not often you hear those five ambassadors 
[of the P5 + 1] all saying they agree with each other. I think the demonstration of unity 
behind this deal was really striking."91 Being presented with a united front of five of the 
world’s greatest powers, and knowing that they represented the opinion of virtually 
every nation in the world except for Israel, must have been extremely compelling for 
Democratic senators.  
Another key factor that differentiates the P5 + 1’s attempts at suasive 
reverberation from Israel’s is that the P5 + 1 were perceived as being ‘on the same side’ 
as a Democratic President and working to support his agenda. In particular, the leaders 
and ambassadors of these states (with the possible exception of Russia) had none of the 
personal baggage and animosities with the White House that Netanyahu and Dermer 
did. Unlike Netanyahu, whose personal history left him compromised, these states and 
their representatives were perceived as objective and disinterested in the domestic 
political ramifications of the deal. To Democrats, they appeared wholly focused on the 
substantive issues surrounding the JCPOA. This is in sharp contrast to Netanyahu, 
whom Democrats knew all too well was a foe of the President and a friend to 
Republicans. His attempts at suasive reverberation appeared less credible because it 
was difficult for Democrats to distinguish between Netanyahu’s perhaps sincere 
concerns regarding the substance of the JCPOA and his partisan goals and allegiances, 
both at home and in the US.  
  
Conclusions 
 
This paper suggests several preliminary conclusions regarding how suasive 
reverberation operates. First, states attempting suasive reverberation should keep in 
mind that the apparent choice domestic players face between ‘deal’ and ‘no deal’ is not 
always straightforward. No deal is always a contested concept; a key strategy of those 
                                                             
90 Putnam 1988 456. 
91 Beatty 2015 
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opposing any given agreement will be to suggest that no deal really only means a better 
deal in the future, while those supportive of the agreement will likely respond by 
stressing the finality of the agreement on the table, whether this representation is 
accurate or not.  
Secondly, my findings suggest that a fundamental distinction should be made 
between ‘hostile takeover’ attempts at suasive reverberation and those attempted 
through COG collusion.  Specifically, suasive reverberation attempts coordinated with 
the permission and assistance of the COG of the target country are more likely to 
succeed than those attempted without such coordination, and are especially more 
effective than appeals actively opposed by the target state’s COG. This is because COG 
assistance can act as a ‘force multiplier’ and ‘guide’ by helping to coordinate the foreign 
source’s message with friendly domestic forces and by providing inlets into the closed, 
unfamiliar, and often byzantine domestic political institutions of the target country.  
Thirdly, in multi-party democracies, partisan (ideological) perception of foreign 
powers can function as the medium through which foreign suasive reverberation is 
interpreted. Liberal parties generally, including those in the United States, are likely to 
be more responsive to multilateral appeals, as well as to suasive reverberation 
originating from international institutions. Perhaps the most powerful suasive 
reverberation for liberals is that of a group of respected foreign leaders speaking on 
behalf of ‘the world community’ or ‘global opinion’ – precisely what prevailed in the 
case of the JCPOA.         
In contrast, conservative parties, predisposed to suspicions of ‘meddling’ and 
preoccupied with sovereignty concerns, are only likely to heed suasive reverberation 
from a few countries perceived as key allies. For the United States, this list is small: 
Israel and perhaps Great Britain. It is even possible that increasing levels of multilateral 
involvement might make conservative domestic players less responsive to suasive 
reverberation attempts, due to the exceptionalist beliefs and seeming contempt for other 
nations that are a readily detectible strain at least in American conservative political 
thought. In short, suasive reverberation attempts targeted at conservative parties will 
more often than not fail. Side payments, threats, and other ‘hard’ forms of pressure will 
probably be more productive methods for foreign states wishing to influence these 
domestic players than normative or rhetorical appeals.  
  In this unforgiving landscape, nations attempting foreign suasive reverberation 
who ambitiously want to appeal to both liberal and conservative domestic players and 
thus maximize their odds of success should take care that both their appeals and their 
delivery mechanism for such appeals are unimpeachably non-partisan. It is not enough 
to be non-partisan in only one of these aspects. Netanyahu’s speech itself went out of its 
way to appear neutral by praising the President, Democratic leaders in Congress, and 
avoiding any hint of favoring Republicans over Democrats. However, such effusions of 
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naïveté were accomplished by a decidedly (to Democrats) cynical method of secret 
consultations with Republican leaders, and so were discounted.  
Fourthly, and in a related vein, personalities matter. Democratic knowledge of 
the bitter split between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu, as well as the 
obvious favor Netanyahu showed the Republican party over his long career, 
predisposed Democrats to distrust him.  In contrast, Democrats perceived Angela 
Merkel, David Cameron, and François Hollande (and their respective ambassadors) as 
cool, non-partisan players. It is easy to imagine that a more centrist Israeli COG 
lobbying against the JCPOA (say an Ehud Barak or Shimon Peres) without Netanyahu’s 
toxic personal history and ensconcement in the US political system might have been 
better received by Democrats.   
Finally, nations attempting suasive reverberation must also be cognizant of the 
historical context in which their attempts will be interpreted. Those who can 
successfully play off recent history and weave their message into a broader narrative 
attractive to their target will be more likely to succeed. Those who ignore this 
imperative and fail to craft a credible counter-narrative to their opponent’s spin on 
events (“those who started the Iraq war want to start another with Iran”) will likely see 
their attempts at suasive reverberation subsumed into a depiction that will end in an 
unfavorable result for their cause.  
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